Speedy Justice and Timeless Delays: The
Validity of Open-Ended "Ends-of-Justice"
Continuances Under the Speedy Trial Act
Greg Ostfeldt
The federal district courts of the United States face a
peculiar time crunch each time they confront a new criminal
prosecution. Every year, federal judges must cope with tens of
thousands of criminal cases which have become increasingly
complex and time-consuming.' At the same time, the courts are
procedurally constrained in terms of the amount of time they are
permitted to devote to each new case. The Speedy Trial Act2
("STA") mandates dismissal of any federal criminal case in which
an indictment is not issued within thirty days of arrest or in
which a trial does not begin within seventy days of indictment or
arraignment. Designed by Congress to reduce recidivism and increase deterrence through the efficient administration of justice,
the STA paradoxically threatens to thwart its own objectives
whenever a complex and time-consuming prosecution comes before the courts.
The drafters of the STA were cognizant of this danger and
constructed the statute to accommodate it. Recognizing the practical need to reconcile the STA with the many unavoidable delays
intrinsic to the criminal process, the drafters enumerated nine
specific exclusions that toll the STA's time limits.3 Eight of the
exclusions are specifically targeted to common sources of delay
such as pretrial motions and joining of new codefendants. The
ninth confers discretion upon judges to grant a continuance when
necessary to serve the "ends of justice."4 These exclusions, espe-
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' See Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judicial Conference of the U.S.,
Proposed Long Range Plan for the FederalCourts 10 (1995) (observing that "the average
[federal criminal] case has increased in complexity"); Rory K Little, Myths and Principles
of Federalization,46 Hastings L J 1029, 1043 (1995) (recognizing that although the number of federal criminal cases has remained relatively stable from year to year, the character of those cases has "shifted dramatically towards larger numbers of narcotics and
weapons offenses").
2 Pub L No 93-619, 88 Stat 2076 (1975), codified at 18 USC §§ 3131-74 (1994).
18 USC § 3161(h).
18 USC § 3161(h)(8).
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cially the ends-of-justice exclusion, have become indispensable to
the practical judicial administration of complex federal cases.5
Unfortunately, the STA conspicuously fails to specify
whether there is a time limit requirement for ends-of-justice continuances. It fails to address whether judges may issue openended continuances in cases where the trial judge is unable to
determine precisely how long the ends-of-justice exclusion should
last. The text of the statute does not speak directly to the issue of
open-ended continuances. The legislative history, which offers
contradictory policy statements and countervailing judicial interests, only offers limited guidance. As a matter of policy, the STA
contains a competing set of goals; while strict time limits deter
crime and reduce recidivism, ends-of-justice continuances provide
courts with needed flexibility when delaying a trial is in the public interest.
The STA's ambiguity on this important issue has created
substantial confusion among the federal courts of appeals. Despite the relative frequency with which complex cases arise,
courts have yet to resolve whether the STA permits an ends-ofjustice continuance to be open-ended in such cases. To date,
seven circuits have staked out positions on the issue. This Comment divides those positions into three categories: the "definite
duration" approach prohibits open-ended ends-of-justice continuances, stating that every continuance must be specifically limited
in duration and justified on the record; the "reasonable duration"
approach permits open-ended ends-of-justice continuances so
long as they are reasonable in length; and the "reasonable relation" approach permits open-ended ends-of-justice continuances
only so long as they can continue to be justified by reference to
their original rationales.
This Comment argues that the "reasonable relation" approach provides the best balance between the STA's goal of judicial efficiency and the practical flexibility embodied in the endsof-justice exclusion. Under the "reasonable relation" approach, a
court should tie the duration of the continuance to its rationale;
it should grant an open-ended continuance only when it is impossible to determine an end date and the rationale for the continuance supports the open-ended duration. Part I summarizes the
' Federal trials rarely begin within the STA's seventy-day time limit. In fact, "the average time for disposition of federal criminal cases is more than five months." Little, 46
Hastings L J at 1051 (cited in note 1), citing Michael V. Bork, FederalJudicialCaseload:
A Five-Year Review, 1989-1993 7 (1994). Trial courts rely on the STA's exclusions to prevent dismissal of these cases. The ends-of-justice exclusion in particular is "frequently invoked." Id.
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structure and content of the STA, with particular emphasis on
the ends-of-justice exclusion and how it operates. Part II then describes the three different approaches and examines their relative popularity among the appellate courts. Finally, Part III
evaluates each approach and argues that the "reasonable relation" approach accords best with the text, legislative history, and
district court plans implementing the STA.
I.

THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT AND THE ENDS-OF-JUSTICE EXCLUSION

The STA provides that in every federal criminal action an
indictment must be filed within thirty days of arrest,' and a trial
must begin within seventy days of indictment or arraignment.'
Failure to abide by these time limits results in dismissal of the
case, either with or without prejudice depending on such factors
as the seriousness of the alleged offense and the facts and circumstances surrounding the delay.8
To mitigate this rather harsh remedy, several provisions of
the STA provide the trial court with the flexibility to accommodate delays that are beyond the court's control. The STA recognizes an extensive list of exclusions that exempt specific types of
delay from the statute's time limit computations.9 These exclusions accommodate the various non-administrative delays that
inevitably arise in the criminal justice context. They provide

6 18 USC § 3161(b) ("Any information or indictment charging an individual with the
commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges.").
7 18 USC § 3161(c)(1) ("In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial
of a defendant... shall commence within seventy days from the filing date (and making
public) of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer ofthe court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs.").
18 USC § 3162(a)(1) provides:
If,
in the case of any individual against whom a complaint is fied ...no indictment
or information is filed within the time limit required by section 3161(b) as extended
by section 3161(h) of this chapter, such charge against that individual ... shall be
dismissed or otherwise dropped. In determining whether to dismiss the case with or
without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led
to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this
chapter and on the administration ofjustice.
The exclusions are listed in 18 USC § 3161(h). Representative examples include any
delay resulting from proceedings or examinations to determine the mental competency or
physical capacity of the defendant; trial on other charges; interlocutory appeal; pretrial
motions; transportation of defendant from another district or to and from places of examination or hospitalization; consideration of proposed plea agreements; and unavailability of an essential witness.
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courts with the flexibility to address postponements resulting
from circumstances such as disposition of pretrial motions, ° addition of new codefendants," and resolution of interlocutory appeals. 2
Despite the flexibility conferred by these exclusions, only one
provides judges with any substantial degree of discretion as to
both its applicability and its length. Section 3161(h)(8) permits a
court to grant a continuance, on its own motion or at the request
of either party, when the court finds that the ends of justice to be
served by such a continuance outweigh the best interests of both
the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 3 In considering
whether such a delay serves the ends of justice, judges are directed to consider such factors as the complexity of the case, the
availability of counsel, and whether failure to grant a continuance would likely result in a miscarriage of justice. 4
Notwithstanding the presence of these criteria, substantial
uncertainty remains as to when an ends-of-justice continuance is
appropriate and what procedures must be followed in granting
such a continuance. Indeed, the ends-of-justice continuance provision of the STA has become the subject of intense judicial scrutiny and debate. Cases abound addressing such questions as the
circumstances under which ends-of-justice continuances are
permissible," whether the rationale for such continuances must
18 USC § 3161(h)(1)(F).
18 USC § 3161(h)(7).
18 USC § 3161(h)(1)(E).
" 18 USc § 3161(h)(8) allows exclusion of "[a]ny period of delay from a continuance
12

granted by any judge... on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by
taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy
trial."
" 18 USC § 3161(h)(8)(B).
" See, for example, United States v Ruth, 65 F3d 599, 606 (7th Cir 1995), cert denied,
116 S Ct 1548 (1996) (finding an ends-of-justice continuance to be appropriate in response
to a defendant's refusal on two occasions to provide handwriting samples); United States
v Reavis, 48 F3d 763, 770-71 (4th Cir), cert denied, 115 S Ct 2597 (1995) (finding an endsof-justice continuance appropriate on complexity grounds in a case involving eight attorneys, six defendants, a thirty-three count indictment, and the possibility of a federal
death penalty prosecution); United States v Fields, 39 F3d 439, 442-46 (3d Cir 1994)
(authorizing an ends-of-justice continuance to prepare pretrial motions and permit plea
negotiations to continue); United States v Carroll, 26 F3d 1380, 1390 (6th Cir 1994)
(finding an ends-of-justice continuance to be appropriate where a key witness was unable
to testify for medical reasons); United States v Smith, 24 F3d 1230, 1234-35 (10th Cir),
cert denied, 115 S Ct 270 (1994) (allowing an ends-of-justice continuance where otherwise
the defendant would have had only five days to prepare a defense to a new indictment
containing eight additional counts); United States v Jones, 23 F3d 1307, 1310-11 (8th Cir
1994) (permitting an ends-of-justice continuance to stand where the defendant's attorney
moved to withdraw as counsel after being threatened by the defendant); United States v
Occhipinti, 998 F2d 791, 797-98 (10th Cir 1993) (upholding a government request for an
ends-of-justice continuance for additional preparation time where the request was not
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be stated in the record,16 and whether this statement may be entered into the record retroactively. 7
The most intractable question surrounding the ends-ofjustice continuance, however, is whether such a continuance may
be open-ended in duration. Because neither the text nor the legislative history of the statute explicitly addresses the issue, it has
proven to be a particularly difficult problem for courts to resolve.
The next Section explores the different judicial solutions offered
in response to this statutory silence.
motivated by lack of due diligence); United States v Pasehall,988 F2d 972, 975 (9th Cir),
cert denied, 510 US 925 (1993) (approving an ends-of-justice continuance granted when
grand jury proceedings were delayed by bad weather); United States v Ortega-Mena, 949
F2d 156, 159-60 (5th Cir 1991) (rejecting continuances granted to prevent conflict with
other proceedings on the court's calendar); United States v Gates, 935 F2d 187, 188 (11th
Cir 1991) (allowing an ends-of-justice continuance where the defendant's attorney suffered serious physical injury prior to trial); United States v Vega, 860 F2d 779, 786-87
(7th Cir 1988) (reemphasizing that ends-of-justice continuances cannot be granted in respouse to court congestion, but affirming a continuance based on complexity); United
States v Monroe, 833 F2d 95, 98-99 (6th Cir 1987) (allowing exclusion of time expended in
preparing pretrial motions under an ends-of-justice continuance when the circumstances
support such a continuance); United States v Andrews, 790 F2d 803, 807-08 (10th Cir
1986) (rejecting an ends-of-justice exclusion for delay resulting from a congested court
calendar and a judge's other business); United States v Theron, 782 F2d 1510, 1512-14
(10th Cir 1986) (rejecting an ends-of-justice continuance based on complexity, the codefendant's need for preparation time, and the desirability of trying all defendants at once
where the defendant had moved for severance from codefendants and was not out on
bail); United States v Crane, 776 F2d 600, 602-05 (6th Cir 1985) (holding an ends-ofjustice continuance due to court congestion to be inappropriate); United States v Gallardo, 773 F2d 1496, 1505-06 (9th Cir 1985) (reaffirming that ends-of-justice continuances
cannot be premised on court congestion, but holding that a continuance granted in response to a stipulation by both parties that they needed additional time to prepare for
trial as a result of delayed rulings on pretrial motions was legitimate).
" See, for example, United States v Pasquale, 25 F3d 948, 951-52 (10th Cir 1994)
(rejecting time excluded under an ends-of-justice continuance that was not justified contemporaneously on the record); United States v Williams, 12 F3d 452, 460 (5th Cir 1994)
(holding that statement of an explicit rationale on the record is not required where the
reasons for an ends-of-justice continuance are obvious); United States v Blackwell, 12 F3d
44, 46-47 (5th Cir 1994) (declaring that failure to set forth a contemporaneous rationale
on the record renders an ends-of-justice continuance invalid); United States v Newman, 6
F3d 623, 627 (9th Cir 1993) (finding dismissal required when the district court failed to
state its rationale for granting an ends-of-justice continuance); United States v Crawford,
982 F2d 199, 204-05 (6th Cir 1993) (rejecting an ends-of-justice continuance where the
district court failed to set forth its findings in favor of the continuance).
17 See, for example, United States v Spring, 80 F3d 1450, 1456 (10th Cir), cert denied,
117 S Ct 385 (1996) (distinguishing between entering findings in support of a preexisting
ends-of-justice continuance on the record retroactively, which is valid, and granting a new
ends-of-justice continuance retroactively, which is invalid); United States v Kelly, 45 F3d
45, 47 (2d Cir 1995) (holding a retroactive ends-of-justice finding to be illegitimate);
United States v Fields, 39 F3d 439, 443 (3d Cir 1994) (stating that the district court's rationale for granting an ends-of-justice continuance need not be placed on the record at the
time the continuance is granted); United States v Lattany, 982 F2d 866, 879-80 (3d Cir
1992) (noting that a district court cannot retroactively justify unauthorized delays by
granting an ends-of-justice continuance).
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THE OPEN-ENDED CONTINUANCES CONTROVERSY: THREE
CONFLICTING SOLUTIONS

A number of federal courts of appeals have disagreed about
whether the STA permits open-ended ends-of-justice continuances. Given the ambiguity of the text and the absence of any
significant discussion of the problem in the STA's legislative history, this disagreement is not particularly surprising. Such disagreement is problematic, however, considering the sheer number of complex criminal cases likely to confront the federal courts
in any given year.
The courts take one of three approaches: the "definite duration" approach, the "reasonable duration" approach, or the
"reasonable relation" approach.
A. The "Definite Duration" Approach
This approach requires that every ends-of-justice continuance be specifically limited in duration and justified on the record with reference to the criteria set forth in the STA. The Ninth
Circuit, the only circuit to apply the "definite duration" test,
adopted it in United States v Pollock. 8 It is the most restrictive

solution to the question of open-ended continuances.
In Pollock, the defendant was indicted by a grand jury for
federal drug charges on June 19, 1982, 119 days after his arrest. 9 Two overlapping orders granting ends-of-justice continuances were issued over the course of the pre-indictment delay.
The first continuance, granted by a magistrate, excluded the time
between March 22 and May 21. The second, granted on separate
grounds by the district court judge, excluded the time between
April 21 and May 24.20 Measured in terms of their specific dates,
the two continuances failed to exclude a total of 55 days between
arrest and indictment, which ordinarily would constitute a violation of Section 3161(b) of the STA.
The government nevertheless asserted that the delay did not
violate the STA's 30-day time limit for indictment." Because the
continuances were granted on separate grounds, the government
argued that the time excluded by the second continuance was intended to extend rather than overlap with the time excluded by
the first continuance. The government contended, in other words,
that each continuance should be treated as an exclusion for a
"726 F2d 1456 (9th Cir 1984).
" Id at 1460.
" Id at 1461.
18 USC § 3161(b).
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specific number of days rather than an exclusion for a designated
period of time: the 61 days excluded by the first continuance
should be added to the 34 days excluded by the second continuance, without adjusting the total to account for the 31 overlapping days. 2 Under that equation, 95 of the 119 days should have
been excluded, bringing the delay within the permissible scope of
the Act.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the government's proposed formula, observing that, under the "plain meaning" of the two orders, the ends-of-justice continuances excluded "periods of time
from particular date to particular date, not for a set number of
days at some indefinite time."23 The court then proceeded to outline the "definite duration" approach, holding that "an 'ends of
justice' extension under Section 3161(b) is proper only if ordered
for a specific period of time and justified on the record with reference to the factors enumerated in Section 3161(h)(8)(B)." 24 The
court reasoned that this approach was most consistent with the
ends-of-justice provision's purpose:
Congress included the "ends of justice" exclusion of time in
recognition that courts need some discretion to deal with
otherwise unavoidable delays in the indictment and trial
process. The "ends of justice" exclusion was not, however,
meant to be a general exclusion for every delay no matter
what its source, but was to be based on specific underlying
factual circumstances.25
Because the continuances in Pollock were not open-ended, the
court did not expressly address their legitimacy. The court's
analysis of the ends-of-justice exclusion did, however, lay the
groundwork for the same court's rejection of open-ended continuances six years later in United States v Jordan."
In Jordan, the defendants were indicted on June 12, 1986,
for numerous federal narcotics offenses. The indictment involved
a complex narcotics conspiracy and included additional charges
against thirty-one codefendants. On July 14, the district court
entered an order granting an indefinite ends-of-justice continuance based on the complexity of the case. The trial eventually
commenced on November 12, 1987, seventeen months after the
initial indictment. The delay was justified solely on the basis of
Pollock, 726 F2d at 1461.
Id.
' Id (emphasis added).
3

2 Id.

- 915 F2d 563 (9th Cir 1990).
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the open-ended ends-of-justice exclusion.
The Jordan court reiterated Pollock's holding that every
ends-of-justice continuance must be specifically limited in duration and justified on the record. Jordan thus expressly extended
Pollock to prohibit open-ended continuances." If a more lenient
rule were adopted, the court reasoned, "one early 'ends of justice'
continuance could exempt the entire case from the requirements
of the Speedy Trial Act altogether, and open the door for wholly
unnecessary delays in contravention of the Act's purpose."2 9 Jordan thus makes it clear that the "definite duration" approach is
intended to apply broadly to all ends-of-justice continuances."
Since its decision in Jordan,the Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed its
belief that the "definite duration" approach adequately vindicates
the demands of justice while protecting the STA from the threat
of judicial circumvention."
B. The "Reasonable Duration" Approach
Other circuits have been reluctant to prohibit open-ended
continuances outright. Indeed, a majority of appellate courts examining the issue have chosen instead to adopt a "reasonable duration" approach that permits open-ended continuances so long
as they are reasonable in length.
The evolution of this approach began with the First Circuit.
In United States v Rush, 2 the defendants were indicted for narcotics offenses in October of 1980. They were not tried until more
than two years later, in December of 1982." 3 Much of this delay
was attributable to valid exclusions for pretrial motions under
Section 3161(h)(1)(F) 4 An ends-of-justice continuance granted on
June 4, 1981, accounted for the remainder of the delay. Because
ten of the fifteen codefendants were being tried on similar

2

Id at 565.

2 Id.
2

Id at 565-66.

' See also Walter v United States, 969 F2d 814, 818 (9th Cir 1992) ("Pollock created a
simple rule for application to a wide spectrum of 'ends of justice' exclusion cases; to be
valid the exclusion must be for a specific period of time and be accompanied by a valid set
of reasons based on the statutory factors.").
1 See United States v Clymer, 25 F3d 824, 829 (9th Cir 1994), quoting Jordan, 915
F2d at 565-66 ("The Speedy Trial Act and its amendments are the product of a series of
delicate legislative compromises.... This delicate balance could be seriously distorted if a
district court were able to make a single, open-ended 'ends of justice' determination early
in a case, which would 'exempt the entire case from the requirements of the Speedy Trial
Act altogether.').
738 F2d 497 (1st Cir 1984).
Id at 501.
See id at 502-06.
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charges in another district, disrupting the district court's trial
schedule, the district court ordered an ends-of-justice continuance extending from May 18, 1981, "until the time of the commencement of this trial."3 5 The court did not set a specific trial
date in the order.
The First Circuit upheld the validity of the open-ended continuance, declaring:
Doubtless it is generally preferable to limit a continuance to
a definite period for the sake of clarity and certainty; but at
the same time it is inevitable that in some cases, like the
present one, a court is forced to order an (h)(8) continuance
without knowing exactly how long the reasons supporting
the continuance will remain valid.3 6
Like the Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit grounded its decision in
the purpose of the ends-of-justice exclusion. The First Circuit,
however, interpreted an (h)(8) continuance to have a different
purpose: "to make the Speedy Trial Act 'flexible enough to accommodate the practicalities of our adversary system."'37 The
court did not think "a rule barring open-ended continuances altogether serves this purpose."
Hence, while the Ninth Circuit sees the ends-of-justice exclusion solely as a provision designed to deal with "otherwise unavoidable delays," the First Circuit interprets it as a broader tool
of practicality. Though not enamored of open-ended continuances, the First Circuit accepts them as valid in circumstances
where the conditions justifying the continuance are sufficiently
indeterminate in duration that the court cannot reasonably be
expected to set a specific end date.
One might be tempted to reconcile Rush and Jordan on the
basis of their factual differences. After all, Rush involved a situation of truly unavoidabledelay, given that the defendant was tied
up in another trial, whereas Jordan merely involved complex issues. Clearly, the court's ability to identify a specific end date for
the ends-of-justice continuance was far greater in Jordanthan in
Rush. Given this significant distinction between the cases, one
might argue that the Ninth Circuit would reach the same result
as the First Circuit were it confronted with a Rush-type scenario.
Such an argument, however, ignores the very strong declarations by the Ninth Circuit that the "definite duration" require-

"

Id at 506.
Id at 508.
Id, quoting United States v Mitchell, 723 F2d 1040, 1044 (1st Cir 1983).
Rush, 738 F2d at 508.
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ment applies in all cases involving ends-of-justice continuances.
While it is possible that the Ninth Circuit would have adopted a
different rule at the outset had it been confronted with a Rushtype situation, it is quite clear at this point that the court is unwilling to backtrack to accommodate individual cases. Indeed,
the Ninth Circuit has indicated in no uncertain terms that it is
unwilling even to consider the factual circumstances of individual open-ended continuances anymore.3' As such, it is clear that
the Rush court's approach constitutes a major departure from the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Jordan.
The First Circuit further defended this approach on the basis
of the speedy trial plan"0 adopted by the District of Maine, which
provides that "[tihe court may grant a continuance under 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8) for either a specific period of time or a period
to be determined by reference to an event (such as recovery from
illness) not within the control of the government . . . ."" Though
not legally bound by the terms of the district court plan, the First
Circuit found this plan to address an important concern: the necessity for granting open-ended ends-of-justice continuances in
cases requiring particular flexibility.
The Rush court fell short of articulating a full "reasonable
duration" standard, but it did hint in dicta that the length of
open-ended ends-of-justice continuances might be limited by a
reasonableness requirement: "It may well be that some sort of
reasonableness limitation is appropriate to prevent continuances
from delaying trials unfairly and circumventing the dismissal
sanctions in the Speedy Trial Act; but we need not decide at what
point, if any, such a limitation might have been exceeded in this
,,42
case ....
The first full articulation of the "reasonable duration" standard came from the Third Circuit. In United States v Lattany,"
the defendant was indicted for attempted bank robbery on July
27, 1989. The trial began 551 days later, on January 29, 1991."
As in Rush, the government defended this delay on the basis of a

See notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
Section 3165(a) of the STA directs each district court to conduct "a continuing study
of the administration of criminal justice in the district court and before United States
magistrates of the district," and to "prepare plans for the disposition of criminal cases in
accordance with this chapter." 18 USC § 3165(a).
41Rush, 738 F2d at 508 n 23 (emphasis added).
42 Id at 508. See also United States v Pringle, 751 F2d 419, 433 (1st Cir 1984)
(suggesting again that open-ended continuances might be limited by a reasonableness requirement, but declining to decide the issue).
982 F2d 866 (3d Cir 1992).
Id at 869.
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number of STA exclusions. Ultimately, however, the permissibility of the delay depended on the legitimacy of an open-ended
ends-of-justice continuance granted on November 30, 1989, in response to a motion by the defendant following numerous changes
of counsel.4 5
The Third Circuit held that "open-ended continuances to
serve the ends of justice are not prohibited if they are reasonable
in length."4 6 In so holding, the court expressed its basic agreement with the Rush court's observation that a rule barring openended continuances threatened to prevent the STA from accommodating the practicalities of the adversarial system." The Lattany court went beyond the Rush court, however, by explicitly declaring that open-ended ends-of-justice continuances must be
reasonable in length.
Like the Rush court, the Lattany court found that the pertinent district speedy trial plan provided strong support for permitting an open-ended ends-of-justice continuance in this case.
The speedy trial plan adopted by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is virtually identical to that of the District of Maine with
respect to ends-of-justice continuances. The plan provides that
the duration of such continuances may be "determined by reference to an event (such as recovery from illness) not within the
control of the government" and that in such instances "the court
shall require one or both parties to inform the court promptly
when and if the circumstances that justify the continuance no
longer exist.""
Although the court found open-ended continuances permissible, it cautioned trial courts not to let the parties have free reign.
It "strongly urge[d]" district courts "not to wait and rely on counsel to inform them when defendants are ready to go to trial, but
instead to set deadlines."4 9 Such an approach, suggested the
court, would "avoid the kind of problems presented by this case,
not only under the Act but also under defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.""
In short, like the Rush court, the Lattany court disfavored
open-ended continuances. Though refusing to prohibit them, the
court urged that they be used only in extreme cases. The reasonableness requirement might thus be seen as yet another disin' See id at 874.
Id at 868.
Id at 881, citing Rush, 738 F2d at 508.
Lattany, 982 F2d at 881.
Id at 883.

Id.
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centive to the use of open-ended continuances and as a tool to
prevent their abuse.
Several other circuits examining the question of open-ended
continuances under the STA have followed Rush and Lattany. In
the time since Lattany was decided, the Fifth5 and Tenth5 2 Circuits have entirely endorsed its reasoning. Similarly, the district
court for the Northern District of Georgia adopted almost word
for word the Rush court's holding with respect to open-ended continuances, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed both the judgment
and the reasoning of the district court without additional comment. 3
Generally, then, the prevalent approach is to permit openended ends-of-justice continuances so long as they are reasonable
in length. Of the seven circuits that have examined the issue, five
have adopted some variation of this "reasonable duration" approach. For these courts, permitting a carefully limited category
of open-ended continuances achieves the best balance between
Congress's desire for efficiency and the practical need for judicial
flexibility.
C. The "Reasonable Relation" Approach
The third approach to the question of open-ended ends-ofjustice continuances states that such continuances are permissible only so long as their open-ended nature remains reasonably
related to the ends of justice. The Second Circuit introduced the
"reasonable relation" approach in United States v LoFranco 4 In
that case, the trial judge issued an order granting an ends-ofjustice continuance that excluded from STA calculations all time
from the date of the order until the beginning of trial.55 The order

" United States v Jones, 56 F3d 581, 586 (5th Cir 1995) (holding that a district court
may grant an open-ended continuance in situations where "it is impossible, or at least
quite difficult for the parties or the court to gauge the necessary length of an otherwise
justified continuance").
52 United States v Spring, 80 F3d 1450, 1458 (10th Cir), cert denied, 117 S Ct 385
(1996) ("We agree with the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits that, while it is preferable to
set a specific ending date for a continuance, there will be rare cases where that is not possible, and an open-ended continuance for a reasonable time period is permissible.").
United States v Burke, 673 F Supp 1574, 1578 (N D Ga 1986) ('This court agrees
with the reasoning of the First Circuit in United States v. Rush, '[dloubtless it is generally preferable to limit a continuance to a definite period for the sake of clarity and certainty; but at the same time it is inevitable that in some cases, like the present one, a
court is forced to order an (h)(8) continuance without knowing exactly how long the reasons supporting the continuance will remain valid."), affd, 856 F2d 1492, 1494 (11th Cir
1988).
818 F2d 276 (2d Cir 1987).
Id at 277.

1997]

Ends-of-Justice Continuances

1049

failed to specify a particular date on which the trial was to commence and therefore was effectively an open-ended ends-ofjustice continuance.
The Second Circuit decided the case without specifically resolving the question of open-ended continuances, concluding instead that the defendant had waived all speedy trial claims by
pleading guilty.5 6 Nonetheless, the court discussed the openended continuance in dicta, observing that the ends-of-justice
provision "could be interpreted as allowing virtually unlimited
delays."5 7 Expressing concerns similar to those articulated by the
Ninth Circuit, the court made it clear that such a result would be
unacceptable:
We assume that this order was made in anticipation of a
particular trial date, thus limiting what might otherwise be
a boundless exclusion of time that could undermine the purposes of the Speedy Trial Act. We remind districtjudges that
the length of an exclusion under § 3161(h)(8) for a "complex"
case, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii), should reasonably be related to the actual needs of the case, and should not be used
either as a calendar control device or as a means of circumventing the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act."
This statement might be read as just another way of applying the
Ninth Circuit's "definite duration" approach, in that it appears to
require the trial court to set a specific trial date and provide a
reasonable justification for the continuance. However, subsequent Second Circuit caselaw indicates that the two approaches
are indeed distinct. In United States v Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp,
the Second Circuit interpreted LoFranco to endorse open-ended
continuances so long as their open-ended nature is reasonably
related to the actual needs of the case.5 9
In Beech-Nut, eight defendants were indicted on 470 counts
of various corporate crimes on November 5, 1986. On November
14, 1986, the district court found the case to be complex within
the meaning of the STA, and granted an ends-of-justice continuance. With regard to when trial would commence, the trial judge
said, "I will suspend all other provisions of the Act until we are
well down the road in the pretrial proceedings and at that point
we will discuss the appropriate date for trial."" The trial did not

57

Id.
Id.

U

Id (emphasis added).

U

871 F2d 1181, 1196-98 (2d Cir 1989).
United States v Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp, 677 F Supp 117, 123 (E D NY 1987),
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actually commence until November 1987, a full year after indictment.
In assessing the validity of this continuance, the Second Circuit reemphasized that the STA does not permit unlimited delays. Moreover, the court declared that the trial court has an obligation to ensure that the length of a continuance is reasonably
related to the needs of the case.6 The court went on to explain
that these limitations did not necessarily prohibit open-ended
continuances:
Though it would perhaps generally be preferable for the
court initially to set a tentative trial date, it is not an abuse
of discretion in a case such as this to postpone the setting of
a date until the extent of the needed pretrial proceedings becomes clearer, so long as there is no intent or appearance
that unlimited or undue delay will be permitted.62
This statement distinguishes the "reasonable relation" approach
from the "definite duration" approach. The Ninth Circuit's
"definite duration" approach requires that all ends-of-justice continuances be specifically limited in duration at the time of issuance. In contrast, the Second Circuit's "reasonable relation" approach permits ends-of-justice continuances of uncertain length
so long as they are not intended to permit unlimited delay and so
long as the ultimate length of the continuance is reasonably related to the needs of the particular case. In this way, the
"reasonable relation" approach is clearly more flexible than the,
"definite duration" approach.
The distinction between the "reasonable relation" approach
and the "reasonable duration" approach is more subtle. The
"reasonable duration" approach permits an ends-of-justice continuance to be of any reasonable length once the court has found
that a definite end date is not ascertainable at the time it issues
the continuance. In contrast, the "reasonable relation" approach
demands that the duration of the continuance be directly tied to
its rationale. Thus, under the "reasonable relation" approach, an
open-ended ends-of-justice continuance is valid only for as long
as the circumstances that justified its issuance remain in effect.
For example, a ninety-day continuance might be valid under the
"reasonable duration" approach if the court felt that ninety days
was a reasonable length of time but invalid under the
"reasonable relation" approach if the rationale behind the conaffd, 871 F2d 1181 (2d Cir 1989).
61Beech-Nut, 871 F2d at 1196-97.

Id at 1198.
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tinuance did not justify the full ninety days. In this way, the
"reasonable relation" approach might invalidate a continuance
that the "reasonable duration" approach would find permissible.
Conversely, the "reasonable relation" approach might permit
some open-ended ends-of-justice continuances that the
"reasonable duration" approach would invalidate. For example, a
two-year continuance might be valid under the "reasonable relation" approach if the circumstances behind the condition justified
it, while it would be invalid under the "reasonable duration" approach if the court felt that two years was an unreasonable
length of time, regardless of the rationale. Because the validity of
an open-ended ends-of-justice continuance under the "reasonable
relation" approach rests on the continued existence of the circumstances justifying its issuance, such a continuance might remain valid indefinitely-as long as those circumstances continue
to exist. Although such a result is to some extent foreclosed by
Beech-Nut's requirement that the continuance not have the intent or appearance of permitting unlimited or undue delay, it is
nonetheless possible that the "reasonable relation" approach
might permit some delays that the "reasonable duration" approach could not countenance.63
Perhaps in response to this risk of effectively unlimited delays under Beech-Nut, the Second Circuit has subsequently modified its holding in Beech-Nut by recognizing an independent time
limitation requirement on ends-of-justice continuances. This in
effect moves the court closer to the Ninth Circuit's "definite duration" approach. In United States v Gambino," the Second Circuit
held that:
The length of an exclusion for complexity must be not only
limited in time, but also reasonably related to the actual
needs of the case. Generally a trial court should set at least
a tentative trial date in granting a complex case exclusion.
In not doing so, it risks having the exclusion "used either as
a calendar control device or as a means of circumventing the
requirements of the Speedy Trial Act."65

Other courts have been reluctant to endorse the Beech-Nut interpretation of
LoFranco. In United States v Boyd, for example, the court noted, "LoFranco'sdicta is no
stronger than a reminder to district court judges that the complex case exclusion should
not be used 'either as a calendar control device or as a means of circumventing the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act.'" 792 F Supp 1083, 1093 (N D 11 1992) (citations
omitted).
"59 F3d 353 (2d Cir 1995), cert denied, 116 S Ct 1671 (1996).
"Id at 358 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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While not prohibiting open-ended continuances, the Gambino holding does sever the duration requirement of an ends-ofjustice continuance from its rationale requirement. The Gambino
holding therefore might appear to prohibit open-ended continuances de facto by requiring that all ends-of-justice exclusions be
limited in time, in addition to being reasonably related to the
needs of the case. Such a holding would be a substantial retreat
from Beech-Nut, which construed the duration of an ends-ofjustice continuance strictly as a function of its rationale. The
limitations on an ends-of-justice continuance under Beech-Nut
were entirely rationale dependent. No independent time limitations existed. Separating the length of the continuance from its
rationale, as Gambino does, thus might be seen to make an openended ends-of-justice continuance virtually impossible by obliging the trial judge to set some time limit regardless of the circumstances justifying the continuance.66
Such a conclusion would, however, read too much into the
Gambino court's ruling. The fact that Gambino requires only a
tentative trial date strongly suggests that its holding still falls
short of a full "definite duration" requirement. It is noteworthy
that even Beech-Nut disallowed open-ended continuances having
the intent or appearance of unlimited or undue delay. Thus, even
before Gambino the Second Circuit maintained some limitations
on the duration of open-ended ends-of-justice continuances.
Gambino simply expanded these limitations into an independent
time limitation requirement. In light of that fact, Gambino ought
to be read as nothing more than a clarification of the "reasonable
relation" approach. The "reasonable relation" approach permits
open-ended continuances so long as they remain reasonably related to their rationales, but pursuant to Gambino it does not
allow them to continue indefinitely.

III.

PRESERVING THE ENDS OF JUSTICE: FINDING THE RIGHT
APPROACH TO OPEN-ENDED CONTINUANCES

Ultimately, resolving the question of whether the STA permits open-ended ends-of-justice continuances requires reconciling
the appellate courts' disparate views of the STA's function within
See, for example, United States v Upton, 921 F Supp 100, 102 (E D NY 1995), affd,
78 F3d 65 (2d Cir 1996) (reversing a prior decision upholding the validity of open-ended
continuances and holding that, in light of Gambino, "[this court is obliged to obey the law
as it is pronounced by the Court of Appeals for this circuit and in this regard, the prior
determination sanctioning an open-ended excludable delay for complexity was erroneous").
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the federal criminal system. As the preceding Part demonstrates,
the differences between the three approaches are the result of
differing judicial interpretations of the goals of the STA and the
ends-of-justice exclusion. Because direct textual and historical
evidence addressing the issue of open-ended ends-of-justice continuances is helpful but inconclusive, evaluating the merits of the
three approaches is difficult. Given the absence of any express
declaration of intent with respect to the issue, the problem of
open-ended ends-of-justice continuances must be resolved against
the larger backdrop of the STA's text, legislative history, and
subsequent implementation in the form of district speedy trial
plans. This Part examines Supreme Court interpretations of the
STA's text, legislative statements regarding the purpose of both
the STA and the ends-of-justice exclusion, and district court implementation of the STA through speedy trial plans. The conclusion, in light of this evidence, is that the "reasonable relation"
test best achieves the intent of Congress with respect to both the
STA as a whole and the specific ends-of-justice exclusion.
A. Henderson v United States67 and the Text of the Speedy Trial
Act
In construing legislation, the court's task "is to give effect to
the will of Congress, and where its will has been expressed in
reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."' Unfortunately, in addressing the issue of
open-ended continuances under the STA, the federal courts of
appeals have largely abandoned any expectation of obtaining
guidance from the language of the STA. Because the STA is silent with respect to the length of open-ended ends-of-justice continuances, the federal courts of appeals have largely overlooked
the text of the statute and instead have relied on whatever reasonable interpretations can be derived from the STA's legislative
history.
The text of the statute does not, however, support every interpretation that reasonably follows from the legislative history.
Indeed, the plain language of the STA has serious implications
for the "reasonable duration" approach. As this Part demonstrates, a careful reading of the STA eliminates the "reasonable
duration" approach from the list of plausible judicial solutions.
This is because, although the STA does not explicitly address the
' 476 US 321 (1986).
"Negonsott v Samuels, 507 US 99, 104 (1993), quoting Griffin v Oceanic Contractors,
Inc, 458 US 564, 570 (1982) (internal citations omitted).
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duration of ends-of-justice continuances, the structure and language of the statute indicate that a "reasonableness" limitation
on such continuances is not a viable interpretation.
The Supreme Court has discussed the notion of reasonableness as it relates to other exclusions under the STA and, in so
doing, has provided significant insight into the plain meaning of
the STA. In Henderson v United States, the Supreme Court ex-

amined the question of whether § 3161(h)(1)(F), which excludes
from speedy trial calculations any period of delay caused by a
pretrial motion, is limited in duration solely to reasonable delays.
The Court concluded that § 3161(h)(1)(F) is not so limited.69 In
arriving at this decision, the Court contrasted the text of
§ 3161(h)(1)(F) with the text of § 3161(h)(7). First, the Court observed that the "plain terms of [§ 3161(h)(1)(F)] appear to exclude all time between the filing of and the hearing on a motion
whether that hearing was prompt or not."7" Then, the Court
noted that if Congress had intended to limit the subsection with
a reasonableness requirement, it "clearly knew how" to do it:
in § 3161(h)(7), Congress provided for exclusion of a
"reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for
trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has
not run and no motion for severance has been granted."
Apart from this single instance, every other provision in
§ 3161(h) provides for exclusion of "any period of delay."7'
One could respond that Henderson's reasoning is inapplicable to the issue of open-ended ends-of-justice continuances because Henderson dealt only with delays from pretrial motions,
which are necessarily limited in duration. Given the fundamental
differences between open-ended and finite continuances, one
might argue that open-ended continuances remain subject to a
reasonableness limitation regardless of how one treats closedended continuances under the STA. However, as the Court made
clear, its reasoning is applicable to every provision of Section
3161(h). Section 3161(h)(7) is the one and only provision of Section 3161(h) subject to a reasonableness limitation. All other provisions, including Section 3161(h)(8) (the ends-of-justice exclusion), may legitimately encompass any period of delay that falls
within their terms. Congress could have attached a specific reasonableness limitation to Section 3161(h)(8) just as easily as it
did to Section 3161(h)(7). The fact that it chose not to do so sugHenderson, 476 US at 330.
Id at 326.
"Id at 326-27.
"
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gests, under the Henderson Court's reasoning, that no such limitation exists on the ends-of-justice exclusion.
This analysis leads to the conclusion that the "reasonable
duration" approach to open-ended continuances is not a viable interpretation of the STA. Most courts currently using the
"reasonable duration" approach require that the continuances be
reasonable in length. 2 In light of Henderson's conclusion that
only Section 3161(h)(7) is subject to a reasonableness limitation,
there is reason to doubt that limitation is a viable interpretation
of the ends-of-justice exclusion. Indeed, on its face, the text of
Section 3161(h)(8) extends to "[amny period of delay" to which the
ends-of-justice provision otherwise applies. 3 To burden this provision with a general reasonableness limitation is to impose upon
it a meaning contrary to the statute's plain language as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Henderson."4 Thus, even though
Henderson does not specifically address the question of openended ends-of-justice continuances, the Court's interpretation of
the STA throws into question the "reasonable duration" approach.
Henderson does not close off several alternative interpretations of the ends-of-justice exclusion. First, a court might revert
to the Rush formulation of the "reasonable duration" approach. 5
Recall that Rush recognized the validity of open-ended continuances where circumstances so require, but acknowledged only the
possibility of a reasonableness limitation. Given that such a limitation is contrary to the text of the STA as interpreted by
Henderson, what remains of Rush may be a simple endorsement
of open-ended continuances whenever it is impossible for the
judge to set an end date at the time the continuance is granted.
Under the Rush approach, then, any time a court is forced to order an ends-of-justice continuance without knowing exactly how
long the continuance should remain in effect, that court may order an open-ended continuance unhindered by any general time
limitations.
See text accompanying notes 44-53.
18 USC § 3161(h)(S)(A).
"The Henderson Court did acknowledge that such a limitation, though unsupported
by the text of the STA, might nonetheless be imposed by district courts through their
speedy trial plans. Henderson, 476 US at 328 ("Congress clearly envisioned that any limitations should be imposed by circuit or district court rules rather than by the statute itself. Such rules, developed pursuant to § 3166(), should provide the assurance of a speedy
disposition of pretrial motions."). However, it appears from the Model Statement of Time
Limits and Procedures and various cases that few if any courts have imposed any such
formal time limitations under their speedy trial plans. See notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
' See text accompanying notes 32-42.
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Although this alternative approach is more consistent with
the text of the STA as interpreted in Henderson, it is vulnerable
to the criticism of the Second and Ninth Circuits that the exception could consume the rule. 6 Once the conditions are met for a
single open-ended continuance, absent some form of time limitation, that continuance could be used to delay trial indefinitely.
Second, a court still could, consistent with Henderson, adopt
the "reasonable relation" approach. This approach permits courts
to continue to grant open-ended continuances in circumstances of
unavoidable indeterminacy, but still limits the duration of such
continuances by tying length to rationale. In contrast to the Rush
approach, under which meeting the critical threshold for openended continuances would be sufficient to justify any subsequent
delay, the "reasonable relation" approach requires that an openended continuance be justified in an ongoing manner. That is, the
open-ended continuance remains valid only so long as keeping
the continuance open-ended is reasonably related to the ends of
justice. When the court can plausibly assign a specific end date to
the continuance, the ends of justice would no longer be served by
keeping the continuance open-ended. Just as a delay for a pretrial motion remains valid only as long as the motion remains
unresolved, so too under the "reasonable relation" approach an
open-ended continuance remains valid only as long as a specific
end date cannot be assigned.
This approach might present administrative difficulties for a
court attempting to determine that the circumstances justifying
an open-ended continuance no longer exist. But these difficulties
are not insurmountable. The court could require periodic written
reports from the party who initially requested the open-ended
continuance in order to verify that the circumstances justifying
the continuance still exist. Or, the court could require that it be
informed immediately when the circumstances justifying the continuance cease to exist. Either method should suffice to ensure
that most open-ended ends-of-justice continuances do not outlive
their rationales. Furthermore, by placing the burden on the party
who requested the continuance, each method ensures that the
administrative burden of monitoring such continuances will not
be a heavy one for the court.
Third, a court could adopt the "definite duration" approach
and prohibit open-ended continuances entirely. This would certainly be the easiest solution for the courts to follow, bringing
bright-line simplicity to an otherwise complex question. This op-

76

See text accompanying notes 29-31 and 57-66.
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tion might also reduce the risk of dismissals since, under a
"definite duration" approach, courts would know that any openended continuance would result in dismissal. Nevertheless, serious questions remain as to whether such an approach would be
consistent with the purpose of the ends-of-justice provision.
These and similar questions are the subject of the next Section.
B. Background and Legislative History
The Supreme Court has indicated a willingness to consult
the legislative history of the STA to resolve questions left unanswered by its text.7 7 Although the text of the STA is helpful in
evaluating the viability of the "reasonable duration" approach to
open-ended continuances, it is not so helpful in evaluating the
approaches compatible with Henderson. To evaluate these approaches, it is necessary to follow the Supreme Court's lead and
inquire into the background and legislative history of the STA.
The STA arose from Congress's dissatisfaction with the direction of Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial.'7 Although the right to a
speedy trial is the first right listed in the Sixth Amendment, and
one of the oldest rights recognized in the Constitution, 79 it has received relatively little attention from the Supreme Court."0 Indeed, the Court did not even set forth criteria by which to judge
the right to a speedy trial until the 1972 watershed decision,
Barker v Wingo.5 ' That case involved a five-year delay between
the defendant's indictment for murder and his trial. 2 The Court
' See United States v Taylor, 487 US 326, 333 (1988) ("Because Congress employed
somewhat broad and open-ended language, we turn briefly to the legislative history of the
[Speedy Trial] Act for some additional indication of how the contemplated choice of remedy should be made.").
' The Sixth Amendment states:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
US Const, Amend VI.
7 The origins of the speedy trial right extend back to the English Assize of Clarendon
in 1166 and the Magna Carta of 1215; the right was set forth in the Virginia Declaration
of Rights of 1776, the first colonial bill of rights. See Warren Freedman, The Constitutional Right to a Speedy and FairCriminalTrial 6 (Quorum 1989).
See Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514, 515 (1972) ("Although a speedy trial is guaranteed
the accused by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, this Court has dealt with that

right on infrequent occasions.").
"' 407 US 514, 515-16 (1972).
Id at 516-18.
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explicitly declined the defendant's invitation to hold that trials
must commence "within a specified time period."83 The Court rejected the specific time limit approach first on institutional
grounds, declaring that "such a result would require this Court to
engage in legislative or rulemaking activity, rather than in the
adjudicative process to which we should confine our efforts .... "
The Court also objected on constitutional grounds, finding "no
constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be
quantified into a specified number of days or months."4
Instead of requiring a specific time limit, the Court opted for
an ad hoc balancing test designed to provide a case-by-case
analysis of relevant constitutional factors:
We can do little more than identify some of the factors which
courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some might
express them in different ways, we identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.85
The Court then applied this test and found that the five-year
delay between the indictment and trial did not deprive the defendant of his right to a speedy trial. This result was principally
due to the lack of prejudice resulting from the delay and the defendant's failure to object to the various continuances until near
the end of the delay.86
Congress was highly critical of the Barker test, declaring
that "[t]he task of balancing these factors and arriving at a conclusion which is fair in all cases is a difficult task. It provides no
guidance to either the defendant or the criminal justice system.
It is, in effect, a neutral test which reinforces the legitimacy of
delay."87 However, Congress was not so much concerned with the
implications of the Barker decision for criminal defendants as it
was with the implications of that decision for society. As the
Court observed in Barker,
[T]here is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial
which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to,
the interests of the accused. The inability of courts to proId at 523.
"Id.
Id at 530.
Id at 534-36.
Speedy Trial Act, HR Rep No 93-1508, 93d Cong, 2d Sess 11 (1974), reprinted in
1974 USCCAN 7401, 7405.
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vide a prompt trial has contributed to a large backlog of
cases in urban courts which, among other things, enables defendants to negotiate more effectively for pleas of guilty to
lesser offenses and otherwise manipulate the system. In addition, persons released on bond for lengthy periods awaiting
trial have an opportunity to commit other crimes."8
These concerns inspired Congress to enact the STA. The statement of purpose of the House Report on the STA declared that
"[tihe purpose of this bill is to assist in reducing crime and the
danger of recidivism by requiring speedy trials and by strengthening the supervision over persons released pending trial."9 Indeed, Congress's intention to protect society's interest in speedy
trials is a recurrent theme in the legislative history. In a number
of places, the House Report discusses the economic benefits to society of eliminating long pretrial delays" and the additional deterrence and rehabilitation that would result from decreasing
pretrial delays. 9' Though not ignoring the interests of the accused, the House Report shows that Congress was merely concerned with ensuring that defendants' rights would not be
harmed by the proposed legislation. 2
Barker,407 US at 519.
HR Rep No 93-1508 at 8,reprinted in 1974 USCCAN at 7402 (cited in note 87).
According to the legislative history:
The Committee believes that the right to a speedy trial belongs not only to the defendant, but to society as well. A defendant who is charged with a violation of the
law becomes a burden to society in the sense that his status consumes the time and
energy of all components of the criminal justice system with which he comes in contact: the police, magistrate, clerks of court, probation officers, judges and others.
This creates a financial as well as an administrative burden on the taxpayer. When a
defendant is detained pending trial, the taxpayer must bear the burden of sustaining
him for an indefinite length of time. Most significantly, the defendant may be a danger to the community in which he resides. In the Federal system, although no exact
national data is presently available, it is estimated that three-quarters of all defendants are released awaiting trial. This means that persons who are likely to commit
additional crimes could without adequate supervision and assistance continue to
reap the profits of criminal activity at the expense of the public.
HR Rep No 93-1508 at 15, reprinted in 1974 USCCAN at 7408-09 (cited in note 87).
" Id at 16 (The Committee concurs in the views of the recent Courts report of the
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals which concluded
that faster and efficient criminal processing would increase the deterrent effect of the
criminal law, ease the task of rehabilitation of offenders and reduce crime.").
' Id at 14 concludes:
The Committee finds that placing time limits on criminal proceedings would not
have a detrimental effect on the rights of defendants. The history of speedy trial
legislation has shown that both the defense and the prosecution rely upon delay as a
tactic in the trial of criminal cases. However, from the defendant's point of view, delay is not synonymous with due process. A defendant who is required to wait long
periods to be tried suffers from a magnitude of disabilities which in no way contrib-
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Such statements of legislative purpose are highly probative
of Congress's intent in passing the STA. Congress, by its own
words, intended the STA to remedy the deficiencies of the Barker
test, to vindicate society's interest in speedy justice as a means of
reducing recidivism, and to increase deterrence and rehabilitation of criminal defendants. At the time of the STA's passage,
Congress saw the statute as a procedural tool that would facilitate society's interest in justice.
These broad-based statements of legislative purpose do not
tell a complete story, however. The specific legislative history
surrounding the ends-of-justice provision suggests that the STA
also was intended to provide trial courts with flexibility. Although the House Report discusses the ends-of-justice exclusion
only briefly, it does indicate that the purpose of the exclusion is
"to provide the Court with the flexibility to extend the time limits
of the bill so that they will not operate harshly on the defendant,
the government or society.""3 Here, then, is the flexibility concern
that the First and Third Circuits found so compelling in Rush
and Lattany.
Testimony concerning earlier drafts of the STA is also instructive on the question of legislative intent with respect to
ends-of-justice continuances. At least six different versions of the
STA were proposed before the final version was enacted, and
each bill contained some variation of the ends-of-justice exclusion
or a similar (though broader) "good cause" exclusion. Although
the legislative history of the final enactment is silent on the
question of open-ended continuances, there is one reference to
open-ended continuances in the legislative history of one of the
earlier versions of the STA. The Ervin bill, introduced on February 22, 1971, excluded "any periods of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of either party upon a showing of
good cause."9 4 The excludable delay was limited to seven days. At
the Senate hearings, one witness, Daniel Rezneck, testified in
opposition to the seven-day limitation and discussed the problem
of open-ended continuances:
ute to his well being. If he is incarcerated awaiting trial, unnecessary delay in the
commencement of trial could result in irreparable injury to an innocent individual.
To one who is ultimately found guilty of a criminal offense, the time spent in detention may represent added time to his ultimate sentence and further retard the rehabilitative process.
"Id at 22. See also Speedy Trial Act, S Rep No 93-1021, 93d Cong, 2d Sess 39 (1974),
reprinted in Anthony Partridge, Legislative History of Title I of the Speedy Trial Act of
1974 161 (Fed Judicial Center 1980) ("[Section 3161(h)(8)] allows for the necessary flexibility to make 90 day trials a realistic goal .. ").
"Partridge, Legislative History at 137-38 (cited in note 93).
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The statute or the legislative history should make clear that
open-ended continuances will not extend the 60 day period
and that a substantial showing of good cause is required for
any continuance by either side. But judicial control of continuances through the good cause requirement seems to us a
better method of preventing abuses than the strict 7 day
provision presently provided for.95
Several plausible inferences can be drawn from Congress's
failure, in light of this testimony, to prohibit open-ended continuances under the STA. One such inference is that Congress
was receptive to open-ended continuances. Given that Congress
was made aware of the problem during hearings and nevertheless chose not to act, this is not an unreasonable inference. It remains questionable, however, given the substantial differences
between the Ervin bill and the STA. Testimony by a nonlegislator given in response to a different provision of a different
bill simply may not have been considered in drafting the final
version of the STA, particularly since hearings on the Ervin bill
may have been sparsely attended. Drafters of the STA may simply have been unaware of Rezneck's testimony. Nevertheless, the
testimony raises at least the possibility that drafters of the STA
were aware of the supposed threat of open-ended continuances
and chose not to prohibit them. Though not overwhelming, this
evidence lends some support to the claim that open-ended continuances were within Congress's contemplation in drafting the
STA.
On the other hand, there is strong evidence that Congress
feared circumvention of the STA through the ends-of-justice exclusion. The 1974 Senate Committee Report expressed the view
that the ends-of-justice balancing test was designed precisely to
address this danger:
In order to avoid the pitfalls of.unnecessary rigidity on the
one hand, and a loop-hole which would nullify the intent of
the legislation on the other, a balancing test is established in
order to enable the judge to determine when the "ends of
justice" require an extraordinary suspension of the time
96
limits.

Speedy Trial, Hearings on S 895 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong, 1st Sess 35-36 (1971) (statement of
Daniel A. Rezneck), reprinted in Partridge, Legislative History at 140 (cited in note 93).
S Rep No 93-1021 at 21, reprinted in Partridge, Legislative History at 160 (cited in
note 93).
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A similar sentiment was expressed by Representative Cohen in
the House floor debate, when he argued that the ends-of-justice
continuance is not "a loophole to continue [a case] under the escape provided [in Section 3161(h)(8)]." 9'
It is unclear what implications these statements have for the
open-ended continuances debate. On the one hand, Congress's
fear that the ends-of-justice provision might be abused to circumvent the STA matches the Ninth and Second Circuits' fears
that the exception could swallow the rule. On the other hand, the
Senate Committee Report spoke of the "pitfalls of unnecessary
rigidity" and expressed the view that the balancing test used to
evaluate when an ends-of-justice continuance is appropriate was
sufficient to protect against such circumvention.
If nothing else, the legislative history of the STA explains
why the courts of appeals disagree about the proper approach to
open-ended continuances. The history sets forth two competing
interests, one rooted in efficiency and the other in flexibility. It
provides no guidelines as to how to reconcile these interests
when they come into conflict. It raises concerns about the endsof-justice continuance being used as a loophole, yet simultaneously expresses the opinion that a balancing test may be sufficient to. eliminate that concern.
Far from rendering the legislative history of the STA irrelevant, however, these conflicts within the history demonstrate the
importance of adopting a balanced proposal like the "reasonable
relation" approach. The fact that two conflicting policy interests
are asserted with equal conviction in the legislative history
points towards the necessity of a solution that accommodates
both interests. Such a solution favors allowing open-ended continuances under narrow circumstances, carefully limiting those
circumstances so as to prevent the ends-of-justice exclusion from
undermining the goals of the STA.
Initially, the legislative history suggests a willingness on the
part of Congress to allow some open-ended continuances. That
Congress chose not to prohibit open-ended continuances even after the witness who testified at the Ervin hearing suggested that
it do so may provide some historical support for the claim that
the STA is not averse to all open-ended continuances. More importantly, the House Report's declaration that the ends-of-justice
exclusion was designed to provide flexibility and to prevent the
STA from operating harshly also argues strongly in favor of alColloquy, 1974 House Floor Debate, in 120 Cong Rec H41793 (Dec 20, 1974), reprinted in Partridge, Legislative History at 174 (cited in note 93).
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lowing open-ended continuances in circumstances where failure
to do so could result in harsh consequences or unnecessary rigidity. Thus, these portions of the legislative history appear to disfavor the Ninth Circuit's "definite duration" approach. Categorical denial of open-ended continuances undoubtedly would result
in harsh or unnecessarily rigid results in cases like Rush, where
it is impossible to set a specific trial date.
This evidence notwithstanding, the legislative history also
suggests that any open-ended continuances approach must be
narrowly defined. The fact that Congress declared repeatedly
that the ends-of-justice exclusion should be carefully circumscribed so as not to defeat the function of the STA suggests that
unconstrained open-ended continuances are impermissible. That
certainly rules out adoption of the Rush approach, particularly
where it is not limited by a reasonableness requirement. The unconstrained Rush approach" would potentially permit unlimited
delays based on a single open-ended continuance granted at any
time in the criminal proceedings. The potential for the exception
to swallow the rule is unmistakable.
In contrast, the "reasonable relation" approach provides an
excellent balance between the two competing interests expressed
in the legislative history. With respect to flexibility, the
"reasonable relation" approach permits open-ended ends-ofjustice continuances so long as they remain tied to their rationales. That should prevent harsh or rigid application of the STA in
federal criminal cases. Likewise, with respect to efficiency, the
"reasonable relation" approach curbs abuse in two separate ways.
First, under the Beech-Nut expression of the "reasonable relation" approach, an open-ended continuance ceases to be valid as
soon as its rationale ceases to apply. Thus, ends-of-justice continuances could not remain in force long after the circumstances
justifying them have faded away. Second, under the Gambino
modification, open-ended continuances must be limited in time.
This acts as an independent check on the risk of unacceptably
long delays.9

See text accompanying notes 75-76.
" Of course, this second quality might also be advanced in defense of the "reasonable
duration" approach, in that a reasonableness limitation also acts as an independent check
on unlimited delays. But whereas the "reasonable duration" approach created a general
reasonableness limitation imposing an artificial time limit on all open-ended continuances, Gambino merely reaffirmed that no open-ended continuance may be unlimited in
duration. Only the latter is consistent with the text of the STA. See Part lI.A.
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C. District Court Speedy Trial Plans
To the extent that doubts remain, they can be mitigated by
reference to the STA's implementation through speedy trial
plans. In the past, several courts of appeal have examined pertinent district speedy trial plans in deciding whether an openended continuance is permissible under the STA. Such plans
have been in effect for almost two decades without drawing any
adverse response from Congress. Though these plans are not
binding on the appellate courts, they are often used as evidence
of congressional intent.' Section 3166 was intended to give the
district courts some discretion in enforcing the terms of the STA.
The fact that a number of district court plans apparently permit
open-ended ends-of-justice continuances may therefore be seen as
compelling evidence that the STA permits some such continuances to fall within the discretion of the district courts.
In addition to the plans for Maine and the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, discussed in Rush and Lattany respectively, it
appears that an identical endorsement of open-ended continuances exists in the district court plan for the Northern District of
Georgia.' All three of these plans appear to be based on the
Model Statement of Time Limits and Procedures, provided by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Paragraph
9(d)(3) of the Model Statement, like each of the three district
court plans, permits the duration of an ends-of-justice continuance to be "determined by reference to an event (such as recovery
from illness) not within the control of the government."' 2 Like
the three district court plans, the Model Statement also authorizes the trial court to require one or both parties "to file periodic
reports bearing on the continued existence of such circumstances
[justifying the continuance]."'O°
The fact that this provision has remained unchanged for two
decades, and that Congress has never seen fit to alter the provision or any district court speedy trial plan based on the provision, suggests that open-ended continuances are within the con-

'o,

See, for example, Rush, 738 F2d at 508 n 23, and Lattany, 982 F2d at 881.
United States v Burke, 673 F Supp 1574, 1578 (N D Ga 1986) ("Open-ended con-

tinuances were clearly contemplated by the drafters of the Plan for the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia for Achieving Prompt Disposition of
Criminal Cases. See Paragraph 11(b) ('If the continuance is to a date not certain, the
Court shall require one or both parties to inform the Court promptly when and if the circumstances that justify the continuance no longer exist.')."), affd, 856 F2d 1492 (11th Cir
1988).
"Report on the Implementation of Title I and Title II of the Speedy TrialAct of 1974
59 (Admin Office of the US Courts 1976).
10

Id.
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gressional understanding of the STA. Even assuming, as could
well be the case, that Congress's lack of reaction is due to simple
inattention or disinterest, the fact that numerous district courts
and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts have
exercised their Section 3166 powers in an uninterrupted manner
to authorize open-ended continuances offers strong independent
grounds to defer to their rulemaking judgments.
Where Rush and Lattany erred, however, was in concluding
that this provision could justify the "reasonable duration" approach. The provision much more strongly supports the
"reasonable relation" approach. Allowing the duration of an endsof-justice continuance to be tied to the particular circumstances
justifying its existence is a hallmark of the "reasonable relation"
approach. The validity of the continuance is contingent upon the
continued existence of those facts justifying it. Additionally, the
requirement that the continuance be conditioned upon periodic
reports affirming the continuing existence of the justifying circumstances falls firmly under the "reasonable relation" umbrella.
What the district court plans and the Model Statement suggest,
then, is that an open-ended continuance is permissible so long as
the rationale supporting the continuance remains in effect. Put
another way, an open-ended ends-of-justice continuance is valid
so long as it remains reasonably related to its initial justification.
Where the justification for the continuance ends, or a definite
end date for the continuance becomes clear, the reasonable relationship is severed and the open-ended continuance ceases to be
valid. This analysis is more consistent with the "reasonable relation" approach than with either the "reasonable duration" or the
"definite duration" approaches. Thus, Congress's accession to the
various district court speedy trial plans, combined with the text
and legislative history of the STA, favors a "reasonable relation"
approach to open-ended ends-of-justice continuances. This approach, as outlined in LoFranco and Beech-Nut and further explored in this Section, would permit an open-ended ends-ofjustice continuance initially only if a definite end date could not
be assigned at the time of the continuance's issuance, would require periodic reports affirming the continuing existence of the
circumstances justifying the continuance, and would invalidate
the continuance as soon as it became clear that those circumstances no longer were present.
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CONCLUSION

The text, background, legislative history, and implementation of the STA through district court speedy trial plans all lead
to the conclusion that the STA permits open-ended continuances,
but only those continuances that remain reasonably related to
their initial rationales. To prohibit open-ended continuances entirely would be contrary to the statute's legislative history, which
reveals Congress's desire to give trial courts flexibility. Conversely, to allow open-ended continuances so long as they are
reasonable in length disregards the text of the STA as interpreted by the Supreme Court in United States v Henderson, and
permits a loophole that could swallow the STA and its efficiency
objectives. Tying the validity of an open-ended ends-of-justice
continuance to its initial rationale should ensure that open-ended
continuances would only be granted in circumstances in which it
is truly impossible to determine an end date for the continuance-and that the continuance could last only as long as it remains impossible to make such a determination. The "reasonable
relation" approach therefore strikes an appropriate balance between the STA's efficiency concerns and the ends-of-justice exclusion's flexibility concerns, producing rapid justice while still affording trial judges the discretion they need to accommodate
complex and unusual cases.

